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ABSTRACT To overcome the low reconciliation efficiency problem of Gaussian modulation (GM)-based-
continuous variable (CV)-quantum key distribution (QKD), in this paper, we propose to use discretized
GM (DGM)-based-CV-QKD. The proposed CV-QKD scheme has complexity and reconciliation efficiency
similar to that of discrete modulation (DM)-based-CV-QKD and at the same time solves for the problem of
the nonexistence of strict security proofs for the DM-CV-QKD under the collective attacks. We demonstrate
that the 32-points-based DGMCV-QKD can closely approach the theoretical SKR-limit in medium and high
channel losses regimes. On the other hand, the 64-points-based DGM CV-QKD scheme closely approaches
the SKR-limit for all channel losses.
INDEX TERMS Quantum communication, quantum key distribution (QKD), continuous variable (CV)-
QKD, Gaussian modulation, discrete modulation, information reconciliation, secret-key rate (SKR).
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the recent satellite-to-ground QKD demonstra-
tion [1], the research in QKD is getting momentum. Discrete
variable (DV)-QKD schemes achieve unconditional security
by employing no-cloning theorem. On the other hand, con-
tinuous variable (CV)-QKD schemes employ the uncertainty
principle. One of the key limitations for DV-QKD repre-
sents long deadtime of the single-photon detectors (SPDs),
which limits the baud rate and therefore the secret-key rate
(SKR). In contrast, the CV-QKD schemes employ the homo-
dyne/heterodyne detection instead and as such do not exhibit
this problem. Very popular CV-QKD protocols are those
based on either discretemodulation (DM) [2]–[6] or Gaussian
modulation (GM) [7], [8]. One of the key disadvantages of
GM is related to its low reconciliation efficiency [7], [8].
TheDM-based CV-QKDprotocols, instead, havemuch better
information reconciliation (error correction) efficiency and
are compatible with state-of-the-art fiber-optics communi-
cations’ equipment. Unfortunately, strict security proofs of
DM-based CV-QKD for collective attacks are still not well
developed.
To overcome these key challenges for DV-QKD as
well as for DM-based CV-QKD, such as a nonexistence
of accurate security proofs, we propose to employ dis-
cretized GM (DGM)-based CV-QKD protocol. The proposed
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QKD scheme employs the Gaussian source implemented in
electrical domain instead of the optical Gaussian source.
This scheme has complexity and reconciliation efficiency
comparable to that of DM-CV-QKD schemes and solves
for the strict unconditional security problem of DM-CV-
QKD under collective attacks. We demonstrate that for all
transmission losses the 32-points generated from Gaussian
source in digital-domain in time-varying fashion are suffi-
cient to closely approach theoretical SKR-limit.We also show
that signal constellations designed to faithfully represent the
Gaussian source can also closely approach the SKR-limit,
when used in time-varying fashion.
The paper is organized as follows. The conventional
GM-based CV-QKD scheme is described in Section II.
In Section III, the proposed discretized Gaussian modulation-
based RF-assisted CV-QKD scheme is described. Details of
the generalized RF-assisted heterodyne detector are provided
in Section IV. The illustrative secret-key rate results are
provided in Section V. Section VI provides some relevant
concluding remarks.
II. CONVENTIONAL GAUSSIAN MODULATION-BASED
CV-QKD SCHEMES
The CV-QKD can be implemented by employing either
homodyne detection, where only one quadrature component
is measured at a time (because of the uncertainty princi-
ple), or with heterodyne detection (HD), where one beam
splitter (BS) and two balanced photodetectors are used
65342
2169-3536 
 2019 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
VOLUME 7, 2019
I. B. Djordjevic: On the DGM-Based Continuous Variable-QKD
FIGURE 1. Illustrating Gaussian modulation-based CV-QKD protocols:
(a) homodyne detection-based CV-QKD scheme, and (b) heterodyne
detection-based CV-QKD scheme. ADC: Analog-to-digital conversion, BPD:
Balanced photodetection.
to measure both quadrature components simultaneously,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. To impose the Gaussian modulation on
coherent optical state, instead of optical-domain, we propose
to use the electrical-domain instead (see Fig. 1). For this pur-
pose, we can use either polar coordinates (ρ,φ) or Cartesian
coordinates (I ,Q). In polar coordinates, the 2-D modulator is
composed of a cascade of an amplitudemodulator and a phase
modulator. When the RF input to the amplitude modulator
follows the Rayleigh distribution, while the phase is uniform,
resulting 2-D distribution will be complex Gaussian. HD can
double the mutual information between Alice and Bob com-
pared to the homodyne detection scheme at the expense of
additional 3 dB loss of the beam splitter (BS). In order to
reduce the laser phase noise, the quantum signals are typically
co-propagated together with the time-domain multiplexed
high-power pilot-tone (PT) to align Alice’s and Bob’s mea-
surement bases. To implement CV-QKD both squeezed states
and coherent states can be employed.
Squeezed states-based protocols employ the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, claiming that it is impossible to mea-
sure both quadratures with arbitrary precision. To impose the
information, Alice randomly selects to use either in-phase
or quadrature degree of freedom (DOF). When in-phase DOF
is used (encoding rule I), the squeezed state is imposed on
the in-phase component (with squeezed parameter sI < 1).
On the other hand, inAlice encoding rule Q (when the quadra-
ture is used), the squeezed state is imposed on the quadrature
(with squeezed parameter sQ > 1). On the receiver side, Bob
randomly selects whether to measure either in-phase compo-
nent or quadrature component. Alice and Bob exchange the
encoding rules being used by them to measure the quadrature
for every squeezed state and keep only instances when they
measured the same quadrature in the sifting procedure. There-
fore, this protocol is very similar to the BB84 protocol. After
that the information reconciliation takes place, followed by
the privacy amplification.
In coherent state-based protocols, there is only one encod-
ing rule for Alice. Alice randomly selects a point in 2-D (I,Q)
space from a zero-mean circular symmetric Gaussian distri-
bution. Clearly, both quadratures have the same uncertainty.
Here we again employ the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
On receiver, side Bob performs the random measurement on
either in-phase or quadrature component. When Bob mea-
sures the in-phase component, his measurement is correlated
with the in-phase coordinate of signal constellation point
sent by Alice. On the other hand, when Bob measures the
quadrature component, his measurement result is correlated
with Alice’s quadrature coordinate of transmitted signal con-
stellation point. Clearly, with homodyne detection, Bob is
able to measure a single coordinate of the signal constellation
point sent by Alice using Gaussian coherent state. Bob then
announces which quadrature he measured in each signaling
interval, and Alice selects the coordinate that agrees with
Bob’s measurement quadrature. The rest of the protocol is
the same as for the squeezed states-based protocol.
The CV-QKD system experience the 3 dB loss limitation in
transmittance when the direct reconciliation is used. To avoid
for this problem either reverse reconciliation [10] or the
postelection [11] methods are used. It has been shown
that for Gaussian modulation, Gaussian attack is an opti-
mum attack for both individual attacks [12] and collective
attacks [13], [14]. In incoming section, we described our
proposed discretized GM-based CV-QKD scheme, which can
closely approach the theoretical SKR-limit.
III. PROPOSED DISCRETIZED GAUSSIAN MODULATION
(DGM)-BASED CV-QKD SCHEME
To initialize the proposed QKD system, Alice and Bob pre-
share the common sequence of seeds, corresponding to differ-
ent sizesM of signal constellations generated from Gaussian
source, to be used in subsequent discretized GM-DV-QKD.
In initialization stage, Alice selects at random seed to be used
for Gaussian noise generator. She then generates at random
a sequence of points from Gaussian random generator. She
then splits this sequence into subsequences of length M .
In transmission stage, Alice further randomly selects the
subsequence (Gaussian signal constellation) to use, followed
by a random selection of point from that subsequence, and
imposes it on an RF subcarrier. In-phase and quadrature com-
ponents of such generated points, with the help of arbitrary
waveform generator (AWG), are used as RF inputs of an
electro-optical (EO) I/Q modulator, as shown in Fig. 2. After
the adjustment of the variance vA by the variable optical
attenuator (VOA), such obtained pulse is sent to Bob over the
quantum channel. The channel is characterized by transmis-
sivity T and excess noise ε so that total channel added noise
variance, referred to the channel input, can be expressed in
shot-noise unit (SNU) by χline = 1/T − 1+ ε.
On receiver side, Bob employs the heterodyne coherent
detection together with a phase-noise cancellation (PNC)
stage [2], [3] to control the level of excess noise. The PNC
stage first squares the reconstructed in-phase and quadrature
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FIGURE 2. The proposed RF-assisted discretized GM-CV-QKD scheme. The
configurations of: (a) Alice’s transmitter and (b) Bob’s receiver. VOA:
Variable optical attenuator, BPD: Balanced photodetector.
signals and after that either adds or subtracts them depend-
ing on the optical hybrid type [16]. The PNC stage further
performs bandpass filtering to remove DC component and
double-frequency terms, followed by the down-conversion,
implemented with the help of multipliers and low-pass filters.
On such a way Bob detects a point out of M possible points
from the subsequence, in similar fashion as for DM. Given
that PNC stage cancels the phase noise and frequency offset
fluctuations, it exhibits better tolerance to the excess noise
compared to the traditional DM-based CV-QKD schemes.
Additional details on the generalized RF-assisted heterodyne
detection scheme can be found in Sec. IV.
In sifting procedure, Alice announces the indices of the
seeds being used in every signaling interval. Given that Bob
knows the seeds he can easily identify Gaussian signal con-
stellation being used. After that Alice and Bob perform con-
ventional parameter estimation and classical postprocessing
(information reconciliation and privacy amplification) steps.
Clearly, the receiver complexity is comparable to DM QKD
schemes, but the proposed scheme preserves the uncondi-
tional security under collective attacks offered by GM-based
QKD scheme.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF GENERALIZED RF-ASSISTED
HETERODYNE DETECTION SCHEME
The generic RF-assisted CV-QKD scheme described here
is applicable to any two-dimensional (2-D) signal constel-
lation and as such it represents a generalization of scheme
presented in [3], which considers only M-PSK signals.
The in-phase and quadrature components 2-D constellation
point imposed on RF-subcarrier can be represented as:
sI (t) = ARe
{
(I (t)+ jQ (t)) ejωRF t
}
= A [I (t) cos (ωRF t)− Q (t) sin (ωRF t)] , (1a)
sQ (t) = AIm
{
(I (t)+ jQ (t)) ejωRF t
}
FIGURE 3. The configuration of 2× 4 optical hybrid used in Fig. 2, based
on 3dB directional couplers, followed by balanced photodetectors (BPDs).
= A [Q (t) cos (ωRF t)+ I (t) sin (ωRF t)] , (1b)
where ωRF is the RF radial frequency [rad/s], while I (t)
and Q(t) represent the in-phase and quadrature coordinates
of the RF signal. The modulation constant A is used to
vary the modulation variance of the signal vA, typically
expressed in SNU. For instance, for 8-star-QAM we have
that (I , Q) ∈{(1,1), (−1,1), (−1,−1), (1, −1), (1 + √3,0),
(0, 1+√ 3), (−1−√3,0), (0,−1−√3)}. The RF-subcarrier
signal can be generated with the help of an arbitrary wave-
form generator (AWG). Alternatively, an RF mixer can
be used instead. By biasing both in-phase and quadrature
branches of the EO I/Q modulator at pi /4-point, which is
achieved by setting the DC voltage to Vpi /4 (where the Vpi is
the half-wave switching voltage), the in-phase RF input of I/Q
modulator can be written as VI (t) = (2/pi )Vpi sI (t), while
the quadrature RF input by VQ (t) = (2/pi )Vpi sQ (t), so that
the I/Q modulator output signal can be represented (in small
signal analysis) as:
Eo (t) ∼=
√
Ps
2
ej(ωTx t+φTx+pi/4)
−A [I (t)+ jQ (t)]√Psej[(ωTx+ωRF )t+φTx ]. (2)
In Eqn. (2),Ps denotes the laser output power,ωTx is the trans-
mit laser radial frequency, and φTx represents the transmit
laser phase noise process. Therefore, the first term represents
unmodulated optical carrier, while the second term represents
the modulated signal.
On receiver side, when 2×4 optical hybrid, based on
3dB directional couplers, is used as shown in Fig. 3, by
squaring and subtracting the in-phase and quadrature pho-
tocurrents, denoted respectively as iI and iQ, followed by
bandpass filtering (BPF) to remove the DC component and
double-frequency terms, we obtain:
r (t) = 1
R2PsPLO
√
2
BPF
[
i2I (t)− i2Q (t)
]
= A [I (t) cos (ωRF t − pi/4)− Q (t) sin (ωRF t − pi/4)]
+ nNB (t) , (3)
where nNB(t) denotes the equivalent narrowband noise at RF
subcarrier level, PLO denotes the power of local oscillator
laser, andR denotes the photodiode responsivity. Nowwe per-
form the down-conversion process [multiplication followed
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by the low-pass filters (LPFs)] to obtain:
rI (t) ∼= LPF [r (t) 2 cos (ωRF t − pi/4)] ∼= AI (t)+ n′I ,
rQ (t) ∼= LPF [r (t) 2 sin (ωRF t − pi/4)] ∼= −AQ (t)+ n′Q,
(4)
where n’I and n’Q are equivalent in-phase and quadrature low-
pass additive noise processes. Clearly, the outputs of down-
conversion block are proportional to in-phase and quadrature
components of transmitted signal. Even though this scheme
is described in context of 2-D modulation schemes, such as
M-ary PSK and M-ary QAM, this scheme is also applicable
to any higher-dimensional signaling schemes.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE SKR RESULTS
The expression for secret fraction (SF), obtained by one-way
postprocessing, for reverse reconciliation, is given by:
SF = βI (A;B)− χ (B;E) , (5)
where I (A;B) represents the mutual information between
Alice and Bob, while the second term χ (B;E) corresponds
to the Holevo information between Eve and Bob. We use
β to denote the reconciliation efficiency. For the GM with
heterodyne detection the mutual information is calculated by:
I (A;B) = log2
(
v+ χtotal
1+ χtotal
)
, (6)
where χtotal = χline + χhet/T with χhet representing the
variance due to heterodyne detection being equal to [1 +
(1 − η) + 2vel]/η, with η denoting the detector efficiency.
In Eqn. (6), v = vA + 1, with vA being the average Alice’s
variance. However, for the discretized Gaussian modulation
with subsequences of sizeM , the expression (6) is not appli-
cable. The mutual information I (A;B) for DGM is calculated
as described in [17], [18]; in other words, we can write:
I (A;B)
= log2M
−Ez
{
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
log2
M−1∑
k=0
e−
(sk,I+zI−sm,I )2+(sk,Q+zQ−sm,Q)2
2σ2
}
,
(7)
where sm = (sm,I, sm,Q) is the transmitted symbol, sk is a
possible received symbol, and σ 2 is the variance of Gaus-
sian channel noise. Clearly, the expectation operator E{·} is
applied for different additive complex Gaussian noise realiza-
tions, that is z=[z1z2 . . . zl . . . ]T, where zl = zl,I+jzl,Q.
The Holevo information between Bob and Eve, for hetero-
dyne detection, is determined by [7]–[15]:
χ (B;E) = g
(
λ1−1
2
)
+g
(
λ2−1
2
)
−g
(
λ3−1
2
)
−g
(
λ4−1
2
)
, (8)
where g (x) = (x + 1) log2 (x + 1) − x log2 x is the entropy
of a thermal state with the mean number of photons being x.
FIGURE 4. Normalized SKRs for proposed discretized GM-QKD protocol
vs. channel loss for different signal constellation sizes assuming that
reconciliation efficiency is: (a) β = 0.85 and (b) β = 0.95.
The λ-parameters are defined by [7]–[15]:
λ1,2 =
√
1
2
(
A±
√
A2−4B
)
, λ3,4 =
√
1
2
(
C ±
√
C2−4D
)
,
(9)
where A, B, C, and D parameters are determined by [7]–[15]:
A
= v2 (1−2T )+2T+T 2 (v+χline)2 , B = T 2 (1+Tvχline)2 ,
C
=
Aχ2het+B+1+2χhet
[
v
√
B+T (v+χline)
]
+2T (v2−1)
T 2 (v+χtotal)2
,
D
=
(
v+χhet
√
B
)2
T 2 (v+χtotal)2
. (10)
For CV-QKD schemes, the secrecy rate can be interpreted as
the normalized SKR, where the normalization is with respect
to the signaling rate Rs.
In Fig. 4, we provide the SKR results for the proposed
DGM-based CV-QKD protocol, for different subsequences
(constellation) sizes.
In calculations, the electrical noise variance is set
to vel = 10−2, the excess noise variance to ε = 10−3, detector
efficiency is set to η = 0.85, and reconciliation efficiency is
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FIGURE 5. Normalized SKRs when OSCD-based CV-QKD is used for
different signal constellation sizes.
set to β = 0.85 in Fig. 4(a) and β = 0.95 in Fig. 4(b). Clearly,
for channel loss larger than 18 dB, discretized GM with
16 points is sufficient to achieve the theoretical GM-CV-QKD
limit. For smaller channel loss values there is a certain degra-
dation in normalized SKR. On the other hand, the discretized-
GM with 32 points closely approaches the SKR-limit for
both medium and high channel losses. Finally, the discretized
GM-based CV-QKD with 64 points closely approaches the
theoretical SKR-limit for all channel loss, except when chan-
nel loss is close to 0 dB.
We also study the SKR performance of a particular ver-
sion of discretized GM-QKD, in which for each seed the
optimized signal constellation design (OSCD) algorithm [19]
is run based on a training sequence from the Gaussian gen-
erator to get faithful representation of the source. In this
version, the coordinates of corresponding OSCD constella-
tions are stored in look-up-table (LUT). The index of the
seed is now used as an address to get the coordinates from
the LUT. The SKR results are summarized in Fig. 5, for the
same parameters being used in Fig. 4(a). For channel loss
larger than 18 dB, the 8-OSCD-based QKD scheme closely
approaches theoretical GM-QKD SKR-limit. On the other
hand, 16-OSCD-based CV-QKD scheme closely approaches
the SKR-limit for channel losses larger than 12 dB.
For comparison purposes, the SKR results for eight-state
DM-CV-QKD protocol, proposed in [6], are provided as well,
which are well below the 8-OSCD-based CV-QKD scheme.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To solve for low reconciliation efficiency problem of the
GM-based CV-QKD scheme, we have proposed to use the
discretized GM-based CV-QKD. This scheme has complex-
ity and reconciliation efficiency similar to the DM-based
CV-QKD and at the same time solves for the problem of
nonexistence of strict security proofs for DM-based CV-QKD
schemes under collective attacks. In medium and high
transmission loss regimes 32-DGM-based CV-QKD scheme
closely approaches the theoretical SKR-limit. On the other
hand, 64-DGM-based scheme approaches the SKR-limit
for all attenuation regimes. The 16-OSCD-based CV-QKD
scheme closely approaches SKR-limit for channel loss larger
than 12 dB.
REFERENCES
[1] S.-K. Liao et al., ‘‘Satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution,’’ Nature,
vol. 549, no. 7670, pp. 43–47, Sep. 2017.
[2] Z. Qu and I. B. Djordjevic, ‘‘Four-dimensionally multiplexed eight-state
continuous-variable quantum key distribution over turbulent channels,’’
IEEE Photon. J., vol. 9, no. 6, Dec. 2017, Art. no. 7600408.
[3] Z. Qu, I. B. Djordjevic, and M. A. Neifeld, ‘‘RF-subcarrier-assisted four-
state continuous-variable QKD based on coherent detection,’’ Opt. Lett.,
vol. 41, no. 23, pp. 5507–5510, Dec. 2016.
[4] T. C. Ralph, ‘‘Continuous variable quantum cryptography,’’ Phys. Rev.
A, Gen. Phys., vol. 61, Dec. 1999, Art. no. 010303.
[5] R. Namiki and T. Hirano, ‘‘Security of quantum cryptography using bal-
anced homodyne detection,’’ Phys. Rev. A, Gen. Phys., vol. 67, Feb. 2003,
Art. no. 022308.
[6] A. Becir, F. A. A. El-Orany, and M. R. B. Wahiddin, ‘‘Continuous-variable
quantum key distribution protocols with eight-state discrete modulation,’’
Int. J. Quantum Inform., vol. 10, no. 1, Feb. 2012, Art. no. 1250004.
[7] R. S. García-Patrón, ‘‘Quantum information with optical continuous vari-
ables: From bell tests to key distribution,’’ M.S. Thesis, Faculte des Sci.
Appl. Theorie l’Inf. Commun., Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels,
Belgium, 2007.
[8] C. Weedbrook et al., ‘‘Gaussian quantum information,’’ Rev. Mod. Phys.,
vol. 84, no. 2, p. 621, May 2012.
[9] S. Fossier, E. Diamanti, T. Debuisschert, R. Tualle-Brouri, and P. Grangier,
‘‘Journal of physics B: Atomic, molecular and optical physics improve-
ment of continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems by using
optical preamplifiers,’’ J. Phys. B, At. Mol. Opt. Phys., vol. 42, May 2009,
Art. no. 114014.
[10] F. Grosshans and P. Grangier. (2002). ‘‘Reverse reconciliation protocols
for quantum cryptographywith continuous variables.’’ [Online]. Available:
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0204127
[11] C. Silberhorn, T. C. Ralph, N. Lütkenhaus, and G. Leuchs, ‘‘Continuous
variable quantum cryptography: Beating the 3 dB Loss Limit,’’ Phys. Rev.
Lett., vol. 89, Sep. 2002, Art. no. 167901.
[12] F. Grosshans and N. J. Cerf, ‘‘Continuous-variable quantum cryptography
is secure against non-Gaussian attacks,’’Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 92, Jan. 2004,
Arty. no. 047905.
[13] R. García-Patrón and N. J. Cerf, ‘‘Unconditional optimality of Gaussian
attacks against continuous-variable quantum key distribution,’’ Phys. Rev.
Lett., vol. 97, Nov. 2006, Art. no. 190503.
[14] M. Navascués, F. Grosshans, and A. Acín, ‘‘Optimality of Gaussian attacks
in continuous-variable quantum cryptography,’’ Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 97,
Nov. 2006, Art. no. 190502.
[15] Y. Shen, H. Zou, L. Tian, P. Chen, and J. Yuan, ‘‘Experimental study
on discretely modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution,’’
Phys. Rev. A, vol. 82, Aug. 2010, Art. no. 022317.
[16] I. B. Djordjevic, Advanced Optical andWireless Communications Systems.
Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017.
[17] I. Djordjevic, ‘‘LDPC-codedMIMO optical communication over the atmo-
spheric turbulence channel using Q-ary pulse-position modulation,’’ Opt.
Express, vol. 15, no. 16, pp. 10026–10032, Aug. 2007.
[18] G. Ungerboeck, ‘‘Channel coding with multilevel/phase signals,’’ IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-28, no. 1, pp. 55–67, Jan. 1982.
[19] T. Liu and I. B. Djordjevic, ‘‘On the optimum signal constellation design
for high-speed optical transport networks,’’ Opt. Express, vol. 20, no. 18,
pp. 20396–20406, Aug. 2012.
IVAN B. DJORDJEVIC held appointments with the
University of the West of England and the Univer-
sity of Bristol, U.K., Tyco Telecommunications,
USA, National Technical University of Athens,
Greece, and State Telecommunication Company,
Yugoslavia. He is currently a Professor in elec-
trical and computer engineering and optical sci-
ences with the University of Arizona, a Director of
the Optical Communications Systems Laboratory
(OCSL) and Quantum Communications (QuCom)
Laboratory, and a Co-Director of the Signal Processing and Coding Labo-
ratory. He has authored or coauthored six books and more than 500 journal
and conference publications, and holds 46 U.S. patents.
Mr. Djordjevic serves as a Senior Editor/Member of the Editorial Board
for the following journals, IOP Journal of Optics, the IEEE COMMUNICATIONS
LETTERS, Physical Communication Journal (Elsevier), and Frequenz. He is
an OSA Fellow.
65346 VOLUME 7, 2019
